Context-dependent agent evaluation with orthogonal equilibrium learning

arXiv cs.AISeptember 29, 2026en

arXiv:2609.31897v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Many applications require to evaluate agents under contextual information (e.g., a prompt, task, or user group). We study how to perform such context-dependent agent evaluation from offline feedback. Existing score-based models for this purpose (e.g., Bradley-Terry) impose a transitive preference ordering, which fails to reflect collective preferences when human judgements are heterogeneous. Inspired by social choice theory, we frame evaluation as a contextual game between two players, each selecting a distribution over agents as the strategy to receive greater collective preference than the other. Then, the support of the Nash equilibrium defi

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