Correction or Manipulation? Measuring Epistemic Vigilance in LLM Agents Under User Pressure

arXiv cs.AIen

Correction or Manipulation? Measuring Epistemic Vigilance in LLM Agents Under User Pressure

arXiv:2610.36453v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents that answer questions and act on behalf of users must decide when to yield to a user who disagrees. Disagreement may correct a genuine error or may be an attempt at manipulation. Prior work shows that models frequently abandon correct answers when challenged by users, yet it remains unclear whether they distinguish correction from manipulation or merely differ in their propensity to concede. We examine this question across seven LLMs from four vendors in two studies, one on the answers agents give and one on the actions they take as customer-support agents whose policy permits account changes only for verified users. Simulated users

This is a short summary published by AI Global Wire. The full article is owned and hosted by arXiv cs.AI — open it there to read it in full.

Read the full story at arXiv cs.AI
  • Forskning
  • Agenter
  • Reglering

Related AI news