Learning to Report Unsafe Tasks in a Multi-Agent Game

arXiv cs.AIOctober 8, 2026en

arXiv:2610.09002v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When agents share a reward for completed tasks, reporting unsafe work can reduce the reporter's reward by stopping a task. Audits can make reporting optimal without ensuring that further training teaches a silent team to report. We study this learning problem in a game where any witness can stop a task by reporting. With $k$ witnesses per task sharing a policy and drawing independently, the expected-reward derivative with respect to their shared silence probability counts each task's benefit $k$ times at universal silence. The comparison with universal reporting counts it once. For arbitrary policy groups, we give an audit condition sufficient

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