Who Should Know What? Empirical Information Design for Multi-Agent LLM Economies
arXiv cs.AIen
arXiv:2611.07667v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The performance of multi-agent LLM systems depends not only on the capabilities of the underlying models but also on information-sharing policies, which govern what information each agent observes and at what level of detail. But does providing AI agents with more detailed information always improve collective outcomes, or can transparency paradoxically degrade efficiency? To investigate this, we introduce empirical information design, an experimental framework that systematically compares disclosure policies across economic markets populated by LLM agents, while holding interaction rules and models fixed. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs in multi
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