Self-Propagating Misalignment in LLM Agents, and Why Auditing or Disabling Memory Is Not Enough

arXiv cs.AIOctober 6, 2026en

arXiv cs.AI

AI Global Wire

arXiv:2610.04083v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Memory poisoning attacks on LLM agents typically assume an external adversary who plants content in the agent's persistent memory to steer its behavior. We instead study, with no adversary involved, whether a misaligned agent can write a goal it cannot yet act on to persistent memory, so that a future aligned agent carries it out when the opportunity arises. We investigate this threat, which we refer to as self-propagation of misalignment, across 20 different scenarios, whose misaligned goals include self-preservation, power-seeking, undermining oversight, reward hacking, and deceiving the user. We simulate misalignment in 11 frontier models us

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